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Abstract Tournament solutions, i.e., functions that associate with each complete and
asymmetric relation on a set of alternatives a non-empty subset of the alternatives,
play an important role in the mathematical social sciences at large. For any given tour-
nament solution S , there is another tournament solution S˚ which returns the union
of all inclusion-minimal sets that satisfy S -retentiveness, a natural stability criterion
with respect to S . Schwartz’s tournament equilibrium set (TEQ) is defined recur-
sively as TEQ = ˚TEQ. In this article, we study under which circumstances a number
of important and desirable properties are inherited from S to S˚ . We thus obtain a
hierarchy of attractive and efficiently computable tournament solutions that “approx-
imate” TEQ, which itself is computationally intractable. We further prove a weaker
version of a recently disproved conjecture surrounding TEQ, which establishes T˚C—
a refinement of the top cycle—as an interesting new tournament solution.
Keywords Tournament Solutions · Retentiveness · Tournament Equilibrium Set
1 Introduction
Many problems in the mathematical social sciences can be addressed using tour-
nament solutions, i.e., functions that associate with each complete and asymmetric
dominance relation on a set of alternatives a non-empty subset of the alternatives. For
instance, tournament solutions play an important role in social choice theory, where
the binary relation is typically defined via pairwise majority voting (Moulin, 1986;
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2Laslier, 1997). Other application areas include multi-criteria decision analysis (Ar-
row and Raynaud, 1986; Bouyssou et al., 2006), zero-sum games (Fisher and Ryan,
1995; Laffond et al., 1993b; Duggan and Le Breton, 1996), coalitional games (Brandt
and Harrenstein, 2010), and argumentation theory (Dung, 1995; Dunne, 2007).
Examples of well-studied tournament solutions are the top cycle (TC), the
Copeland set (CO), the minimal covering set (MC), the Banks set (BA), and the Slater
set (see Laslier, 1997). Recent years have also witnessed an increasing interest in
these concepts by the computer science community, particularly with respect to their
computational complexity. For example, the top cycle and the minimal covering set
of a tournament can be computed efficiently, i.e., in polynomial time (Brandt et al.,
2009; Brandt and Fischer, 2008), whereas computing the Banks set and the Slater set
is NP-hard (Woeginger, 2003; Alon, 2006; Conitzer, 2006).1
The tournament equilibrium set (TEQ), introduced by Schwartz (1990), ranks
among the most intriguing, but also among the most enigmatic, tournament solu-
tions. Schwartz defined TEQ on the basis of the concept of retentiveness. For a given
tournament solution S , a set B of alternatives is said to be S -retentive if S selects from
each dominator set of some alternative in B a subset of alternatives that is contained
in B. The requirement of retentiveness can be argued for from the perspective of coop-
erative majority voting, where the voters have to come to an eventual agreement as to
which alternative to elect (see Schwartz, 1990, for more details). Additionally, reten-
tiveness strongly resembles the game-theoretic notion of closure under best-response
behavior (Basu and Weibull, 1991).
Schwartz defines TEQ as the union of all inclusion-minimal TEQ-retentive sets.
This is a proper recursive definition, as the cardinality of the set of dominators of an
alternative in a particular set is always smaller than the cardinality of the set itself.
Schwartz furthermore conjectured that every tournament contains a unique minimal
TEQ-retentive set. As was shown by Laffond et al. (1993a) and Houy (2009a,b), TEQ
satisfies any one of a number of important properties such as monotonicity if and only
if Schwartz’s conjecture holds. Brandt et al. (2012) recently disproved Schwartz’s
conjecture by showing the existence of a counter-example of astronomic proportions.
The interest in TEQ and retentiveness in general, however, is hardly diminished as
concrete counter-examples to Schwartz’s conjecture have never been encountered,
even when resorting to extensive computer experiments (Brandt et al., 2010). Ap-
parently, TEQ satisfies the above mentioned properties for all practical matters. A
small number of properties is known to hold independently of Schwartz’s conjec-
ture: TEQ is contained in the Banks set (Schwartz, 1990), satisfies composition-
consistency (Laffond et al., 1996), and is NP-hard to compute (Brandt et al., 2010).
In this article, we intend to shed more light on the fascinating notion of retentive-
ness by viewing the matter from a more general perspective. For any given tourna-
ment solution S , we define another tournament solution S˚ (“S ring”) which yields
the union of all minimal S -retentive sets. The top cycle, for example, coincides with
˚TRIV , where TRIV is the trivial tournament solution that always returns all alterna-
tives. By definition, TEQ is the only tournament solution S for which S˚ equals S .
1 NP-hardness is commonly seen as strong evidence that a problem cannot be solved efficiently. The
interested reader is referred to the articles by Woeginger (2003) and Brandt and Fischer (2008) for a more
detailed discussion.
3With every tournament solution S we then associate an infinite sequence
(S (0), S (1), S (2), . . .) of tournament solutions such that S (0) = S and S (k+1) = ˚S (k)
for all k ≥ 0. Our investigation concentrates on three main issues regarding such
sequences and the solution concepts therein:
– the inheritance of desirable properties,
– their asymptotic behavior, and
– the uniqueness of minimal retentive sets.
First, while TEQ itself fails to satisfy the desirable properties mentioned above
in very large tournaments, we do know that some less sophisticated tournament so-
lutions such as TRIV do. In Section 4, we therefore investigate which properties are
inherited from S to S˚ , and vice versa. We find that the former is the case for most
of the properties mentioned above, provided that S always admits a unique minimal
S -retentive set, whereas the latter also holds without this assumption. Composition-
consistency is a notable exception: we prove that TEQ is the only composition-
consistent tournament solution defined via retentiveness.
Second, we find that for every S the sequence (S (0), S (1), S (2), . . .) converges to
TEQ. In Section 5, we investigate the properties of these sequences in more detail by
focusing on the class of tournaments for which Schwartz’s conjecture holds. We show
that all tournament solutions in the sequence associated with the trivial tournament
solution TRIV are contained in one another, contain TEQ, and, by the inheritance
results of Section 4, share the desirable properties of TRIV . Efficient computability
turns out to be inherited from S to S˚ even without any additional assumptions. While
this does not imply that TEQ itself is efficiently computable, the tournament solutions
in the sequence for TRIV provide better and better efficiently computable approxima-
tions of TEQ. We also establish tight bounds on the minimal number k such that S k is
guaranteed to coincide with TEQ, relative to the size of the tournament in question.
Third, the sequence associated with each tournament solution gives rise to a corre-
sponding sequence of weaker versions of Schwartz’s conjecture. The first such state-
ment regarding the sequence for TRIV alleges that every tournament has a unique
minimal TRIV-retentive set and was proved by Good (1971). In Section 6 we prove
the second statement: there is a unique minimal TC-retentive set in every tournament.
We conclude by giving an example of a well-known tournament solution for which
the analogous statement does not hold. More precisely, we identify a tournament with
disjoint Copeland-retentive sets.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we provide the terminology and notation required for our results. For
a more extensive treatment of tournament solutions and their properties the reader is
referred to Laslier (1997).
42.1 Tournaments
Let X be a universe of alternatives. The set of all non-empty finite subsets of X will
be denoted by F(X). A (finite) tournament T is a pair (A,), where A ∈ F(X) and 
is an asymmetric and complete (and thus irreflexive) binary relation on X, usually
referred to as the dominance relation.2 Intuitively, a  b signifies that alternative a is
preferable to alternative b. The dominance relation can be extended to sets of alter-
natives by writing A  B when a  b for all a ∈ A and b ∈ B. We further write T(X)
for the set of all tournaments on X.
For a tournament (A,), an alternative a ∈ A, and a subset B ⊆ A of alternatives,
we denote by DB,(a) the dominion of a in B, i.e.,
DB,(a) = { b ∈ B : a  b },
and by DB,(a) the dominators of a in B, i.e.,
DB,(a) = { b ∈ B : b  a }.
Whenever the dominance relation  is known from the context or B is the set of all
alternatives A, the respective subscript will be omitted to improve readability. We
further write T |B = (B, {(a, b) ∈ B × B : a  b}) for the restriction of T to B.
The order |T | of a tournament T = (A,) refers to the cardinality of A, and Tn
denotes the set of all tournaments with at most n alternatives, i.e.,
Tn = {T ∈ T(X) : |T | ≤ n}.
We will sometimes write that a statement holds in Tn if the statement holds for all
tournaments T ∈ Tn.
A tournament isomorphism of two tournaments T = (A,) and T ′ = (A′,′) is
a bijection pi : A → A′ such that for all a, b ∈ A, a  b if and only if pi(a) ′ pi(b).
A tournament (A,) can be conveniently represented as a directed graph with vertex
set A and edge set {(a, b) : a  b}. See Figure 1 for an example.
2.2 Components and Products
An important structural notion in the context of tournaments is that of a component. A
component is a subset of alternatives that bear the same relationship to all alternatives
not in the set.
Definition 1 Let T = (A,) be a tournament. A non-empty subset B of A is a com-
ponent of T if for all a ∈ A \ B, either B  {a} or {a}  B.
For a given tournament T˜ , a new tournament T can be constructed by replacing
each alternative with a component. For notational convenience, we tacitly assume
that N ⊆ X.
2 This definition slightly diverges from the common graph-theoretic definition where  is defined on A
rather than X. However, it facilitates the sound definition of tournament solutions.
5Definition 2 Let B1, . . . , Bk ⊆ X be pairwise disjoint sets and consider tournaments
T˜ = ({1, . . . , k}, ˜) and T1 = (B1,1), . . . , Tk = (Bk,k). The product of T1, . . . ,Tk
with respect to T˜ , denoted by Π(T˜ ,T1, . . . ,Tk), is the tournament (A,) such that
A =
⋃k
i=1 Bi and for all b1 ∈ Bi, b2 ∈ B j,
b1  b2 if and only if i = j and b1 i b2, or i , j and i ˜ j.
2.3 Tournament Solutions
A Condorcet winner in a tournament is an alternative that dominates every other
alternative. Let Cond(T ) denote the set of Condorcet winners of T = (A,), i.e.,
Cond(T ) = {a ∈ A : a  b for all b ∈ A\{a}}. Due to the asymmetry of the dominance
relation, every tournament contains at most one Condorcet winner.
Since the dominance relation may contain cycles and thus fail to have a Condorcet
winner, a variety of concepts have been suggested to take over the role of singling
out the “best” alternatives of a tournament. Formally, a tournament solution S is
defined as a function that associates with each tournament T = (A,) a non-empty
subset S (T ) of A, and S is non-trivial if there exists a tournament T = (A,) such
that S (T ) is a strict subset of A.
Following Laslier (1997), we require a tournament solution to be independent of
alternatives outside the tournament, invariant under tournament isomorphisms, and
to choose the Condorcet winner whenever it exists.
Definition 3 A tournament solution is a function S : T(X)→ F(X) such that
(i) S (T ) = S (T ′) for all tournaments T = (A,) and T ′ = (A,′) such that T |A =
T ′|A;
(ii) S ((pi(A),′)) = pi(S ((A,))) for all tournaments (A,) and (A′,′) such that
there exists a tournament isomorphism pi of (A,) and (A′,′); and
(iii) If S is non-trivial and Cond(T ) , ∅, then S (T ) = Cond(T ).
The conditions of Definition 3 are trivially satisfied if one invariably selects the
set of all alternatives. The corresponding tournament solution TRIV is obtained by
letting TRIV((A,)) = A for every tournament (A,). The top cycle TC(T ) of a
tournament T = (A,) is defined as the smallest set B ⊆ A such that B  A \ B.
Uniqueness of such a set is straightforward and was first shown by Good (1971). The
Copeland set CO(T ) consists of all alternatives whose dominion is of maximal size,
i.e., CO(T ) = arg maxa∈A |D(a)|.
For two tournament solutions S and S ′, we write S ′ ⊆ S , and say that S ′ is a
refinement of S , if S ′(T ) ⊆ S (T ) for all tournaments T . For example, it can easily be
checked that CO ⊆ TC ⊆ TRIV . To avoid cluttered notation, we write S (A,) instead
of S ((A,)) for a tournament (A,). Furthermore, we frequently write S (B) instead
of S (B,) for a subset B ⊆ A of alternatives, if the dominance relation  is known
from the context.
63 Retentive Sets
Motivated by cooperative majority voting, Schwartz (1990) introduced a tournament
solution based on a notion he calls retentiveness. The intuition underlying retentive
sets is that alternative a is only “properly” dominated by alternative b if b is chosen
among a’s dominators by some underlying tournament solution S . A set of alterna-
tives is then called S -retentive if none of its elements is properly dominated by some
alternative outside the set.
Definition 4 Let S be a tournament solution and T = (A,) a tournament. Then,
B ⊆ A is S -retentive in T if B , ∅ and S (D(b)) ⊆ B for all b ∈ B such that D(b) , ∅.
The set of S -retentive sets for a given tournament T = (A,) will be denoted by
RS (T ), i.e., RS (T ) = {B ⊆ A : B is S -retentive in T }.
Fix an arbitrary tournament solution S . Since the set of all alternatives is trivially
S -retentive, S -retentive sets are guaranteed to exist. If a Condorcet winner exists, it
must clearly be contained in any S -retentive set. The union of all (inclusion-)minimal
S -retentive sets thus defines a tournament solution.
Definition 5 Let S be a tournament solution. Then, the tournament solution S˚ is
given by
S˚ (T ) =
⋃
min⊆ (RS (T )).
Consider for example the tournament solution TRIV , which always selects the set
of all alternatives. It is easily verified that there always exists a unique minimal TRIV-
retentive set, and that in fact ˚TRIV = TC. See Figure 1 for an example tournament.
b c
a
d e
x D(x) TC(D(x))
a {c} {c}
b {a, e} {a}
c {b, d} {b}
d {a, b} {a}
e {a, c, d} {a, c, d}
Fig. 1 Example tournament T = ({a, b, c, d, e},) with ˚TRIV(T ) = TC(T ) = {a, b, c, d, e} and T˚C(T ) =
{a, b, c}. RTC(T ) contains the sets {a, b, c}, {a, b, c, d}, and {a, b, c, d, e}.
For a tournament solution S , we say that RS is pairwise intersecting if for each
tournament T and for all sets B,C ∈ RS (T ), B ∩ C , ∅. Observe that the non-
empty intersection of any two S -retentive sets is itself S -retentive. We thus have the
following.
Proposition 1 For every tournament solution S , RS admits a unique minimal ele-
ment if and only if RS is pairwise intersecting.
7Schwartz introduced retentiveness in order to recursively define the tournament
equilibrium set (TEQ) as the union of minimal TEQ-retentive sets. This recursion
is well-defined because the order of the dominator set of any alternative is strictly
smaller than the order of the original tournament.
Definition 6 (Schwartz, 1990) The tournament equilibrium set (TEQ) is defined re-
cursively as TEQ = ˚TEQ.
In other words, TEQ is the unique fixed point of the ◦-operator. In the tournament
of Figure 1, TEQ coincides with T˚C. Schwartz conjectured that every tournament
admits a unique minimal TEQ-retentive set. This conjecture was recently disproved
by a non-constructive argument using the probabilistic method (Brandt et al., 2012).
While this proof showed the existence of a counter-example, no concrete counter-
example (or even the exact size of one) is known. We let nTEQ denote the largest
number n such that Tn does not contain a counter-example.
Definition 7 nTEQ denotes the largest integer n such thatRTEQ is pairwise intersecting
in Tn.
Only very rough bounds on nTEQ are known. The proof of Brandt et al. (2012)
yields nTEQ ≤ 10136, and an exhaustive computer analysis has shown that nTEQ ≥ 12
(Brandt et al., 2010).
It turns out that the existence of a unique minimal S -retentive set is quintessential
for showing that S˚ satisfies several important properties to be defined in the next
section. Although minimal TEQ-retentive sets are not unique in general, it was shown
by Laffond et al. (1993a) and Houy (2009a,b) that TEQ satisfies these properties for
all tournaments in TnTEQ .
The ◦-operator can also be applied iteratively. Inductively define
S (0) = S and S (k+1) = ˚S (k),
and consider the sequence (S (n))n∈N0 = (S (0), S (1), S (2), . . .). We say that (S (n))n con-
verges to a tournament solution S ′ if for each tournament T , there exists kT ∈ N0 such
that S (n)(T ) = S ′(T ) for all n ≥ kT . It turns out that the limit of all these sequences
is TEQ.
Theorem 1 Every tournament solution converges to TEQ.
Proof Let S be a tournament solution. We show by induction on n that
S (n−1)(T ) = TEQ(T ).
for all tournaments T ∈ Tn. The case n = 1 is trivial. For the induction step, let T =
(A,) be a tournament of order |A| = n + 1. We have to show that S (n)(T ) = TEQ(T ).
Since S (n) is defined as the union of all minimal S (n−1)-retentive sets, it suffices to
show that a subset B ⊆ A is S (n−1)-retentive if and only if it is TEQ-retentive. We
have the following chain of equivalences:
B is S (n−1)-retentive iff for all b ∈ B, S (n−1)(D(b)) ⊆ B
iff for all b ∈ B, TEQ(D(b)) ⊆ B
iff B is TEQ-retentive.
8In particular, the second equivalence follows from the induction hypothesis, since
obviously |D(a)| ≤ n for all a ∈ A. uunionsq
4 Properties of Tournament Solutions Based on Retentiveness
In order to compare tournament solutions with one another, a number of desirable
properties have been identified. In this section, we review five of the most com-
mon properties—monotonicity, independence of unchosen alternatives, the weak and
strong superset properties, and γ̂—and investigate which of them are inherited from
S to S˚ or from S˚ to S . We furthermore show that composition-consistency is never
inherited.
4.1 Basic Properties
A tournament solution is monotonic if a chosen alternative remains in the choice set
when its dominion is enlarged, while everything else remains unchanged. It is inde-
pendent of unchosen alternatives if the choice set is invariant under any modification
of the dominance relation among the alternatives that are not chosen. A tournament
solution satisfies the weak superset property if no new alternatives are chosen when
unchosen alternatives are removed, and the strong superset property if in this case the
choice set remains unchanged. Finally, γ̂ requires that if a the same set of alternatives
is selected in two subtournaments (B1,) and (B2,) of the same tournament (A,),
then this set is also selected in the tournament (B1 ∪ B2,).3 Formally, we have the
following definitions.4
Definition 8 Let S be a tournament solution.
(i) S satisfies monotonicity (MON) if for all a ∈ A, a ∈ S (T ) implies a ∈ S (T ′)
for all tournaments T = (A,) and T ′ = (A,′) such that T |A\{a} = T ′|A\{a} and
D(a) ⊆ D′ (a).
(ii) S satisfies independence of unchosen alternatives (IUA) if S (T ) = S (T ′) for all
tournaments T = (A,) and T ′ = (A,′) such that T |S (T )∪{a} = T ′|S (T )∪{a} for
all a ∈ A.
(iii) S satisfies the weak superset property (WSP) if S (B) ⊆ S (A) for all tourna-
ments (A,) and B ⊆ A such that S (A) ⊆ B.
(iv) S satisfies the strong superset property (SSP) if S (B) = S (A) for all tourna-
ments (A,) and B ⊆ A such that S (A) ⊆ B.
(v) S satisfies γ̂ if S (B1) = S (B2) implies S (B1 ∪ B2) = S (B1) = S (B2) for all
tournaments (A,) and all B1, B2 ⊆ A.
3 γ̂ is a variant of the better-known expansion property γ, which, together with Sen’s α, figures promi-
nently in the characterization of rationalizable choice functions (Brandt and Harrenstein, 2011).
4 Our terminology differs slightly from those of Laslier (1997) and others. Independence of unchosen
alternatives is also called independence of the losers or independence of non-winners. The weak superset
property has been referred to as + or as the Aı¨zerman property.
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a
Fig. 2 Tournament C(T, Ia, Ib) for a given tournament T . The gray circle represents a component isomor-
phic to the original tournament T . An edge incident to a component signifies that there is an edge of the
same direction incident to each alternative in the component.
The five properties just defined—MON, IUA, WSP, SSP, and γ̂—will be called
basic properties of tournament solutions. Observe that SSP implies WSP. Further-
more, the conjunction of MON and SSP implies IUA. To prove that a tournament
solution satisfies all basic properties it is therefore sufficient to show that it satisfies
MON, SSP, and γ̂.
While TRIV trivially satisfies all basic properties, more discriminative tourna-
ment solutions often fail to satisfy some of them. For example, the Copeland set and
the Slater set only satisfy MON and the Banks set (BA) and the uncovered set (UC)
only satisfy MON and WSP. Dutta’s minimal covering set (MC), on the other hand,
satisfies all basic properties.5 The same holds for TEQ for all tournaments in TnTEQ
(Laffond et al., 1993a; Houy, 2009a,b).
4.2 Inheritance of Basic Properties
When studying the inheritance of properties from S to S˚ and vice versa, we will
make use of the following particular type of decomposable tournament. Let C3 =
({1, 2, 3},) with 1  2  3  1, and let Ix be the unique tournament on {x}. For three
tournaments T1, T2, and T3 on disjoint sets of alternatives, let C(T1,T2,T3) be their
product with respect to C3, i.e.,
C(T1,T2,T3) = Π(C3; T1,T2,T3).
Figure 2 illustrates the structure of C(T, Ia, Ib) for a given tournament T . We have the
following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let S be a tournament solution. Then, for each tournament T = (A,)
and a, b < A,
S˚ (C(T, Ia, Ib)) = {a, b} ∪ S (T ).
Proof Let B = S˚ (C(T, Ia, Ib)) and observe that B ∩ A , ∅, because neither {a, b} nor
any of its subsets is S -retentive. Since a is the Condorcet winner in D(b) = {a} and b
is the Condorcet winner in D(c) for any c ∈ B ∩ A, by S -retentiveness of B we have
that a ∈ B and b ∈ B. Also by retentiveness of B, we have S (D(a)) = S (T ) ⊆ B.
We have thus shown that every S -retentive set must contain {a, b} ∪ S (T ), and that
{a, b} ∪ S (T ) is itself S -retentive. uunionsq
5 See, e.g., Laslier (1997) for definitions of these tournament solutions.
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We are now ready to show that a number of desirable properties are inherited
from S˚ to S .
Theorem 2 Let S be a tournament solution. Then each of the five basic properties is
satisfied by S if it is satisfied by S˚ .
Proof We show the following: if S violates one of the five basic properties
MON, IUA,WSP,SSP, or γ̂, then S˚ violates the same property. Observe that if S
violates any of these properties, this is witnessed by a tournament T = (A,) that
serves as a counter-example. In the case of SSP (or WSP), there exists a set B ⊂ A
such that S (A) ⊆ B ⊂ A and S (B) , S (A) (or S (B) * S (A), respectively). In the case
of MON, there exists a ∈ S (T ) such that a < S (T ′) for a tournament T ′ = (A,′) that
satisfies T |A\{a} = T ′|A\{a} and D(a) ⊆ D′ (a). In the case of IUA, S (T ) , S (T ′) for a
tournament T ′ = (A,′) that satisfies T |S (T )∪{a} = T ′|S (T )∪{a} for all a ∈ A. In the case
of γ̂, there exist subsets B1, B2 ⊆ A such that S (B1) = S (B2) and S (B1∪B2) , S (B1).
It thus suffices to show how a counter-example T for S can be transformed into a
counter-example T ′ for S˚ . Let a, b < A and define T ′ = C(T, Ia, Ib). Lemma 1 implies
that S˚ (T ′) = {a, b}∪S (T ). Hence, tournament T ′ constitutes a counter-example for S˚ .
uunionsq
If RS is pairwise intersecting, a similar statement holds for the opposite direction.
The proof of the following result can be found in the appendix. The conjunction of
two properties P and Q is denoted by P ∧ Q.
Theorem 3 Let S be a tournament solution such that RS is pairwise intersecting,
and let P be any of the properties SSP,WSP, IUA,MON ∧ SSP, or γ̂ ∧ SSP. Then,
P is satisfied by S if and only if it is satisfied by S˚ .
We proceed by identifying tournament solutions for which Theorem 3 can be
applied. The following lemma will be useful.
Lemma 2 Let S 1 and S 2 be tournament solutions such that S 1 ⊆ S 2 and RS 1 is
pairwise intersecting. Then, RS 2 is pairwise intersecting and S˚ 1 ⊆ S˚ 2.
Proof First observe that S 1 ⊆ S 2 implies that every S 2-retentive set is S 1-retentive.
Now assume for contradiction that RS 2 is not pairwise intersecting and consider a
tournament (A,) with two disjoint S 2-retentive sets B,C ⊆ A. Then, by the above
observation, B and C are S 1-retentive, which contradicts the assumption that RS 1 is
pairwise intersecting.
Furthermore, for every tournament T , S˚ 2(T ) is S 1-retentive and thus contains the
unique minimal S 1-retentive set, i.e., S˚ 1(T ) ⊆ S˚ 2(T ). uunionsq
Theorem 4 Let S be a tournament solution such that TEQ ⊆ S in TnTEQ . Then, RS (k)
is pairwise intersecting in TnTEQ for all k ∈ N0.
Proof We first prove by induction on k that, for all k ∈ N0, TEQ ⊆ S (k) in TnTEQ . The
case k = 0 holds by assumption. Now let T be a tournament in TnTEQ and suppose that
TEQ(T ) ⊆ S (k)(T ) for some k ∈ N0. By definition, S (k+1)(T ) is S (k)-retentive. We can
thus apply the induction hypothesis to obtain that S (k+1)(T ) is TEQ-retentive. Since
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the minimal TEQ-retentive set of T is unique, it is contained in any TEQ-retentive
set, and we have that TEQ(T ) ⊆ S (k+1)(T ). This proves that TEQ(T ) ⊆ S (k)(T ) for all
T ∈ TnTEQ and all k ∈ N0.
We can now apply Lemma 2 with S 1 = TEQ and S 2 = S (k) to show that RS (k) is
pairwise intersecting in TnTEQ for all k ∈ N0. uunionsq
Among the tournament solutions that satisfy the conditions of Theorem 4 are
TRIV , TC, MC, UC, and BA (see the proof of Theorem 5 in Section 5).
4.3 Composition-Consistency
We conclude this section by showing that, among all tournament solutions that are
defined as the union of all minimal retentive sets with respect to some tournament
solution, TEQ is the only one that is composition-consistent. A tournament solution
is composition-consistent if it chooses the “best” alternatives from the “best” compo-
nents.
Definition 9 A tournament solution S is composition-consistent if for all tourna-
ments T , T1, . . . ,Tk, and T˜ = ({1, . . . , k}, ˜) such that T = Π(T˜ ,T1, . . . ,Tk),
S (T ) =
⋃
i∈S (T˜ )
S (Ti).
Tournament solutions satisfying this property include TRIV , UC, BA, and TEQ.
However, S˚ is not composition-consistent unless S equals TEQ.
Proposition 2 Let S be a tournament solution. Then, S˚ is composition-consistent if
and only if S = TEQ.
Proof It is well-known that TEQ is composition-consistent (Laffond et al., 1996). For
the direction from left to right, let S be a tournament solution different from TEQ, and
assume that S˚ is composition-consistent. Since TEQ is the only tournament solution
S ′ such that S ′ = S˚ ′, there has to exist a tournament T = (A,) such that S (T ) ,
S˚ (T ). Let a, b < A, and define T ∗ = C(T, Ia, Ib). By Lemma 1,
S˚ (T ∗) = {a, b} ∪ S (T ).
On the other hand, by composition-consistency of S˚ ,
S˚ (T ∗) = S˚ (T ) ∪ S˚ (Ia) ∪ S˚ (Ib) = {a, b} ∪ S˚ (T ).
It follows that S (T ) = S˚ (T ), a contradiction. uunionsq
Remark 1 The composition-consistent hull of a tournament solution S , denoted
by S ∗, is defined as the inclusion-minimal tournament solution that is composition-
consistent and contains S (Laffond et al., 1996). It can be shown that (S˚ )∗ = S ∗ for
all tournament solutions S that satisfy S˚ ⊆ S .
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5 Convergence to TEQ
By Theorem 1, every tournament solution converges to TEQ. Particularly well-
behaved types of convergence are those that either yield larger and larger subsets
of TEQ or smaller and smaller supersets of TEQ. The problem with the former type
is that no natural refinement of TEQ is known and it is doubtful whether any such
refinement would be efficiently computable. The latter type, however, turns out to be
particularly useful.
Call a sequence (S (n))n∈N0 contracting if for all k ∈ N0, S (k+1) ⊆ S (k). Intu-
itively, the elements of such a sequence constitute better and better “approximations”
of TEQ. The following lemma identifies a sufficient condition for a sequence to be
contracting.
Lemma 3 Let S be a tournament solution such that TEQ ⊆ S in TnTEQ . If S˚ ⊆ S in
TnTEQ , then S
(k+1) ⊆ S (k) in TnTEQ for all k ∈ N0.
Proof We prove the statement by induction on k for all tournaments in TnTEQ . S˚ ⊆ S
holds by assumption. Now suppose that S (k) ⊆ S (k−1) for some k ∈ N0. As in the proof
of Theorem 4, one can show that TEQ ⊆ S (k). Applying Lemma 2 with S 1 = TEQ and
S 2 = S (k) yields that RS (k) is pairwise intersecting. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 2
again, this time with S 1 = S (k) and S 2 = S (k−1), which gives S (k+1) ⊆ S (k). uunionsq
Theorem 5 For all tournaments with at most nTEQ alternatives, the tournament so-
lutions TRIV, TC, MC, UC, and BA give rise to contracting sequences.
Proof As TRIV obviously satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 3, (TRIV (n))n and
(TC(n))n are contracting. MC satisfies the assumptions because TEQ ⊆ MC in
TnTEQ (Laffond et al., 1993a) and M˚C ⊆ MC in TnTEQ (Brandt, 2011). TEQ ⊆ BA
was shown by Schwartz (1990), and TEQ ⊆ UC follows from BA ⊆ UC. It thus
remains to be shown that U˚C ⊆ UC and B˚A ⊆ BA.
A tournament solution S satisfies strong retentiveness if the choice set of every
dominator set is contained in the original choice set, i.e., if S (D(a)) ⊆ S (A) for all
a ∈ A (Brandt, 2011). It is easy to see that S˚ ⊆ S for every tournament solution S
that satisfies strong retentiveness. Indeed, for an arbitrary tournament T , strong re-
tentiveness implies that S (T ) is S -retentive and that there do not exist any S -retentive
sets disjoint from S (T ).6 Since both UC and BA satisfy strong retentiveness (Brandt,
2011), this completes the proof. uunionsq
Remark 2 One might wonder if MC is contained in the sequence (TRIV (n))n. It is easy
to see that this is not the case: while MC is known to be composition-consistent (see
Laffond et al., 1996), Proposition 2 shows that this is not the case for any TRIV (k)
with k ≥ 1.
Remark 3 For a given tournament solution S , one may further want to compare the
sequence (S (n))n∈N0 with the corresponding sequence (S n)n∈N generated by the re-
peated application of S . Formally, S k(T ) = S (S k−1(T )) where S 1(T ) = S (T ). Since
6 The statement was independently shown by Moser (2009).
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SSP implies that S n = S for all n ∈ N, UC and BA are the only tournament solutions
covered by Theorem 5 for which such a comparison makes sense. It turns out that for
both UC and BA, the sequences (S (n))n∈N0 and (S n)n∈N are incomparable in the sense
that for all n ∈ N, neither S (n) ⊆ S 2 nor S n ⊆ S˚ .
5.1 Iterations to Convergence
We may ask how many iterated applications of the ◦-operator are needed until we
arrive at TEQ. While we have seen that every tournament solution converges to TEQ,
it turns out that no solution other than TEQ itself does so in a finite number of steps.
More precisely, the number of iterations required to reach TEQ increases with the
order of a tournament and can not be bounded by a constant independent of the order.
For a tournament solution S , let kS (n) be the smallest k ∈ N0 such that S (k)(T ) =
TEQ(T ) for all tournaments T ∈ Tn.7
Proposition 3 Let S , TEQ be a tournament solution and let n0 be the order of a
smallest tournament T with S (T ) , TEQ(T ). Then, for every n ∈ N,
kS (n) = max
( ⌊n − n0
2
⌋
+ 1 , 0
)
.
Proof Let f (n) = max
(⌊
n−n0
2
⌋
+ 1, 0
)
. Our goal is to prove that f (n) is both an upper
bound and a lower bound on kS (n).
For the former, we show that S ( f (n))(T ) = TEQ(T ) for all T ∈ Tn. Denote by kS (T )
the smallest number k such that S (k)(T ) = TEQ(T ). Thus, kS (n) = maxT∈Tn kS (T ).
A Condorcet loser in (A,) is an alternative a ∈ A such that D(a) = A \ {a}. We
claim that the following statements hold for every tournament solution S and every
tournament T of order n:
(i) If T has a Condorcet loser, then kS (T ) ≤ kS (n − 1).
(ii) If T has no Condorcet loser, then kS (T ) ≤ kS (n − 2) + 1.
For (i), let a be a Condorcet loser in T = (A,). Then,
S (kS (n−1))(T ) = S (kS (n−1))(A \ {a}) = TEQ(A \ {a}) = TEQ(T ).
The first and the third equality follow from the observations that no minimal retentive
set contains a and that a set B ⊆ A \ {a} is retentive in T if and only if it is retentive in
(A\{a},). The second equality is a direct consequence of the definition of kS . For (ii),
assume that T = (A,) does not have a Condorcet loser. It follows that |D(a)| ≤ n− 2
for all a ∈ A. Similar reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 1 implies that a set B ⊆ A is
S (kS (n−2))-retentive if and only if B is TEQ-retentive. Thus, S (kS (n−2)+1)(T ) = TEQ(T ).
We are now ready to show that kS (n) ≤ f (n) by induction on n. For n ≤ n0,
kS (n) = 0. Now assume that kS (m) ≤ f (m) holds for every m < n, and consider a tour-
nament T of order n. If T has a Condorcet loser, (i) implies that kS (T ) ≤ kS (n − 1) ≤
f (n − 1), where the latter inequality follows from the induction hypothesis. If, on the
7 It can easily be shown that S (`)(T ) = TEQ(T ) for all T ∈ Tn and ` ≥ kS (n).
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Fig. 3 Tournament Tk used in the proof of Proposition 3.
other hand, T does not have a Condorcet loser, (ii) implies that kS (T ) ≤ kS (n−2)+1 ≤
f (n − 2) + 1. Thus, kS (n) ≤ max( f (n − 1), f (n − 2) + 1) = f (n − 2) + 1. A simple
calculation shows that f (n − 2) + 1 = f (n) as desired.
In order to show that kS (n) ≥ f (n), we inductively define a family of tournaments
T0,T1,T2, . . . such that S ( f (|Tk |)−1)(Tk) , TEQ(Tk). Let T0 = (A0,) be a smallest
tournament such that S (T0) , TEQ(T0). By definition, |A0| = n0. Given Tk−1 =
(Ak−1,), let Tk = C(Tk−1, Iak , Ibk ), where ak, bk < Ak−1 are two new alternatives.
Observe that Ak = A0 ∪ ⋃k`=1{a`, b`}. The structure of Tk is illustrated in Figure 3.
Repeated application of Lemma 1 yields
S (k)(Tk) = {ak, bk} ∪ S (k−1)(Tk−1)
= {ak, bk} ∪ {ak−1, bk−1} ∪ S (k−2)(Tk−2)
= . . .
=
k⋃
`=1
{a`, b`} ∪ S (T0).
Since S (T0) , TEQ(T0), we have that S (k)(Tk) , TEQ(k)(Tk) = TEQ(Tk).
We have thus shown that kS (nk) > k, where nk = |Ak | is the order of tourna-
ment Tk. By definition of Tk, nk = n0 + 2k, so kS (nk) > k implies kS (n) >
n−n0
2
for all n ≥ n0 such that n − n0 is even. For the case when n − n0 is odd, i.e., when
n = n0 + 2k + 1 for some k ∈ N0, consider the tournament T ′k = (Ak+1 \ {bk+1},) with
T ′k |Ak+1\{bk+1} = Tk+1|Ak+1\{bk+1}. This tournament of order n has ak+1 as a Condorcet loser.
Thus, S (k)(T ′k) = S
(k)(Tk) , TEQ(Tk) = TEQ(T ′k). This implies that kS (n0+2k+1) > k,
or, equivalently, kS (n) > b n−n02 c. uunionsq
An easy corollary of Proposition 3 is that kS (n) ≤ b n2 c for all tournament solutions.
Since TRIV and TEQ differ for every tournament with two alternatives, we immedi-
ately have kTRIV (n) = b n2 c. Furthermore, Dutta (1990) constructed a tournament T of
order 8 for which MC(T ) , TEQ(T ), and thus kMC(n) = max(b n2 c − 3, 0).
Remark 4 Convergence of the sequence (S (n))n of tournament solutions should not be
confused with convergence of the sequence (S (n)(T ))n of choice sets for a particular
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tournament T . In particular, S (m)(T ) = S (m+1)(T ) does not imply S (m
′)(T ) = S (m)(T )
for all m′ ≥ m. For example, the tournaments Tk constructed in the proof of Propo-
sition 3 satisfy TRIV (m)(Tk) = TRIV (m
′)(Tk) , TEQ(Tk) for all m,m′ < kTRIV (nk).
Consequently, it might be impossible to recognize convergence of (S (n)(T ))n within
less than kS (|T |) iterations.
5.2 Computational Aspects
The sequences (TRIV (n))n and (MC(n))n appear particularly interesting: for all tourna-
ments in TnTEQ , these sequences are contracting, and their members satisfy all basic
properties. In addition, TRIV and MC can be computed efficiently, and we might ask
whether this also holds for TRIV (n) and MC(n) when n ≥ 1. This turns out to be the
case, as a consequence of the following more general result.
Proposition 4 S˚ is efficiently computable if and only if S is efficiently computable.
Proof We show that the computation of S and the computation of S˚ are equivalent
under polynomial-time reductions.
To see that S˚ can be reduced to S , consider an arbitrary tournament T = (A,)
and define the relation R = {(a, b) : a ∈ S (D(b))}. It is easily verified that S˚ (T ) is
the union of all minimal R-undominated sets8 or, equivalently, the maximal elements
of the asymmetric part of the transitive closure of R. Observing that both R and the
minimal R-undominated sets can be computed in polynomial time (see, e.g., Brandt
et al., 2009, for the latter) completes the reduction.
For the reduction from S to S˚ , consider a tournament T = (A,) and define
T ∗ = C(T, Ia, Ib) for a, b < A. By Lemma 1, S (T ) = S˚ (T ∗) \ {a, b}. Clearly, T ∗ can be
computed in polynomial time from T , and S (T ) can be computed in polynomial time
from S˚ (T ∗). uunionsq
This result does not imply that TEQ can be computed efficiently, despite the
fact that both TRIV and MC converge to TEQ. The obvious algorithm for comput-
ing S (n)(T ) recursively computes S (n−1) for all dominator sets, the number and sizes
of which can both be linear in |T |. By Proposition 3, the depth of the recursion can
be linear in |T | as well, which leads to an exponential number of steps. Brandt et al.
(2010) have in fact shown that it is NP-hard to decide whether a given alternative is
in TEQ, which is seen as strong evidence that TEQ cannot be computed efficiently
by any algorithm. Nevertheless, Lemma 3 and Proposition 4 identify sequences of
efficiently computable tournament solutions that provide better and better approxi-
mations of TEQ for all tournaments in TnTEQ .
6 Uniqueness of Minimal Retentive Sets
As shown in Section 4, uniqueness of minimal retentive sets plays an important role:
if RS is pairwise intersecting, then S˚ inherits many desirable properties from S . It
8 A set B ⊆ A is R-undominated if (a, b) ∈ R for no b ∈ B and a ∈ A \ B.
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Fig. 4 Structure of a tournament with two disjoint TC-retentive sets (k is even). A dashed edge (a, b)
indicates that a ∈ TC(D(b)).
is therefore an interesting, and surprisingly difficult, question which tournament so-
lutions are pairwise intersecting. In this section, we answer the question for the top
cycle and the Copeland set.
6.1 The Minimal TC-Retentive Set
We prove that every tournament has a unique minimal TC-retentive set, thus estab-
lishing T˚C as an efficiently computable refinement of TC that satisfies all basic prop-
erties.
Theorem 6 RTC is pairwise intersecting.
Proof Consider an arbitrary tournament (A,), and assume for contradiction that B
and C are two disjoint TC-retentive subsets of A. Let b0 ∈ B and c0 ∈ C. Without loss
of generality we may assume that c0  b0. Then, c0 ∈ D(b0), and by TC-retentiveness
of B there has to be some b1 ∈ B with b1 ∈ TC(D(b0)) and b1  c0. We claim that for
each m ≥ 1 there are c1, . . . , cm ∈ C such that for all i and j with 0 ≤ i < j ≤ m,
(i) ci+1 ∈ TC(D(ci));
(ii) b0  ci and ci  b1 if i is odd, and b1  ci and ci  b0 otherwise; and
(iii) c j  ci if j − i is odd, and ci  c j otherwise.
To see that this claim implies the theorem, consider i and j with 0 ≤ i < j ≤ m. Since
the dominance relation is irreflexive, and by (iii), ci and c j must be distinct alterna-
tives. This in turn implies that the size of C is unbounded, contradicting finiteness
of A. The situation is illustrated in Figure 4.
The claim itself can be proved by induction on m. First consider the case m = 1.
Since b1  c0, and by TC-retentiveness of C, there has to be some c1 ∈ C with
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c1 ∈ TC(D(c0)) and c1  b1, showing (i). Furthermore, by TC-retentiveness of B,
c1 < TC(D(b0)) and thus b0  c1. It follows that (ii) and (iii) hold as well.
Now assume that the claim holds for all k ≤ m. We show that it also holds for
m + 1.
Consider the case when m + 1 is even; the case when m + 1 is odd is analogous.
By the induction hypothesis, b0  cm. Hence, by TC-retentiveness of C, there has to
exist some cm+1 ∈ C with cm+1 ∈ TC(D(cm)) and cm+1  b0, which together with the
induction hypothesis implies (i).
Moreover, since b1 ∈ TC(D(b0)) and cm+1 ∈ D(b0), TC-retentiveness of B yields
b1  cm+1. With the induction hypothesis this proves (ii).
For (iii), consider an arbitrary i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and first assume that i is odd. We
have to prove that cm+1  ci. If i = m, this immediately follows from (i). If i < m, then
by the induction hypothesis, ci  cm, b0  ci, and b0  cm. Hence, {cm+1, ci, b0} ⊆
D(cm). Moreover, as we have already shown, cm+1  b0. Assuming for contradiction
that ci  cm+1, the three alternatives cm+1, ci, and b0 would constitute a cycle in D(cm).
Since cm+1 ∈ TC(D(cm)), we would then have that b0 ∈ TC(D(cm)), contradicting
TC-retentiveness of C. Thus ci  cm+1. As cm+1  b0 and b0  ci, also cm+1 , ci.
Completeness of  implies cm+1  ci.
Now assume that i is even. We have to prove that ci  cm+1. By the induction
hypothesis, cm  ci and b1  ci. Assume for contradiction that cm+1  ci and thus
cm+1 ∈ D(ci). Since i + 1 is odd, we already know that cm+1  ci+1. Furthermore,
ci+1 ∈ TC(D(ci)), and thus cm+1 ∈ TC(D(ci)). However, b1  cm+1 and b1 ∈ D(ci)
imply that b1 ∈ TC(D(ci)), contradicting TC-retentiveness of C. Therefore cm+1  ci.
Since cm+1  cm and cm  ci, we have cm+1 , ci and may conclude that ci  cm+1. By
virtue of the induction hypothesis we are done. uunionsq
Corollary 1 T˚C is efficiently computable and satisfies all basic properties. Further-
more, T˚C ⊆ TC.
Proof Efficient computability follows from Proposition 4 and the trivial observation
that TRIV can be computed efficiently. As RTC is pairwise intersecting, T˚C inherits
all basic properties from TC (Theorem 3). Finally, applying Lemma 2 with S 1 = TC
and S 2 = TRIV yields T˚C ⊆ TC. uunionsq
6.2 Copeland-Retentive Sets May Be Disjoint
For the Copeland set the situation turns out to be quite different: minimal CO-
retentive sets are not always unique. Our proof makes use of a special class of tour-
naments called cyclones.
Definition 10 Let n be an odd integer and A = {a0, . . . , an−1} an ordered set of size
|A| = n. The cyclone on A then is the tournament (A,) such that ai  a j if and only
if j − i mod n ∈ {1, . . . , n−12 }.
We are now in a position to prove the following result.
Proposition 5 RCO is not pairwise intersecting.
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Fig. 5 Partial representation of the tournament T used in the proof of Proposition 5, illustrating that A is
CO-retentive. The case shown is the one where ai = a1. The dotted edges indicate the dominators of a1, all
missing edges in (D(a1),) point downward. It is easy to see that a6 is the Copeland winner in (D(a1),).
Proof We construct a tournament T with 70 alternatives that can be partitioned into
eight subsets A, B0, . . . , B6. A = {a0, . . . , a6} contains seven alternatives, whereas for
each k ∈ {0, . . . , 6}, Bk = {bk0, . . . , bk8} contains nine. First consider the tournament T˜ =
({1, . . . , 14}, ˜), where T˜ |{1,...,7} and T˜ |{8,...,14} are cyclones on {1, . . . , 7} and {8, . . . , 14},
respectively. For all i and j with 1 ≤ i ≤ 7 and 8 ≤ j ≤ 14, moreover, j  i if and
only if j − i ∈ {7, 10}. Now define T as the product
T = Π(T˜ , Ia0 , . . . , Ia6 ,T0, . . . ,T6),
where for each k ∈ {0, . . . , 6}, Tk is the cyclone on Bk. Thus B j  {ai} if j ∈ {i, i +
3 mod 7} and {ai}  B j otherwise.
We claim that both A = {a0, . . . , a6} and B = B0 ∪ · · · ∪ B6 are CO-retentive in T .
For better readability, we will henceforth write ax+y for ax+y mod 7, Bx+y for Bx+y mod 7,
and bkx+y for b
k
x+y mod 9.
For CO-retentiveness of A, fix an arbitrary i ∈ {0, . . . , 6} and consider ai ∈ A. The
dominators of ai are given by
D(ai) = {ai+4, ai+5, ai+6} ∪ Bi ∪ Bi+3.
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Fig. 6 Partial representation of the tournament T used in the proof of Proposition 5, illustrating that B
is CO-retentive. The case shown is the one where bki = b
1
2. The dotted and dashed edges indicate the
dominators of b12. The dashed edges also represent (part of) the dominance relation inside D(b
1
2). All
missing edges in (D(b12),) point downward. It is easy to see that the Copeland winners in (D(b12),) are
exactly the alternatives in T5.
Figure 5 illustrates the case where ai = a1. It is now readily appreciated that in
(D(a1),), ai+5 is only dominated by ai+4, whereas all other alternatives are dom-
inated by at least two alternatives. Accordingly, CO(D(ai)) = {ai+5} ⊆ A, which
implies that A is CO-retentive in T .
For CO-retentiveness of B = B0 ∪ · · · ∪ B6, fix k ∈ {0, . . . , 6} and i ∈ {0, . . . , 8}
arbitrarily and consider bki ∈ Bk. The dominators of bki are given by
D(bki ) = {bki+5, bki+6, bki+7, bki+8} ∪ {ak+1, ak+2, ak+3, ak+5, ak+6} ∪ Bk+4 ∪ Bk+5 ∪ Bk+6.
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Figure 6 illustrates the case where bki = b
1
2. We now find that CO(D(b
k
i )) = Bk+4: each
alternative b ∈ Bk+4 has a Copeland score of 4 + 9 + 9 + 4 + 1 = 27, whereas each of
the alternatives in {ak+1, ak+2, ak+3, ak+5, ak+6} has a score of 2 + 4 + 9 + 9 = 24 and all
other alternatives in D(bki ) have a score of at most 19. It follows that B is CO-retentive
in T . uunionsq
Remark 5 The same construction can also be used to show that C˚O is not monotonic,
which establishes that monotonicity is not inherited in general. To see this, first ob-
serve that both A and B are minimal retentive sets in T , i.e., C˚O(T ) = A∪ B. Now fix
k ∈ {0, . . . , 6} and i ∈ {0, . . . , 8} arbitrarily and consider bki ∈ Bk. Let T ′ be the tour-
nament that is identical to T except that bki is strengthened against all alternatives in
Bk+4. For example, let k = 1. Then T ′ = (A ∪ B,′) with T ′|A∪B\{b1i } = T |A∪B\{b1i } and
D′ (b1i ) = D(b
1
i ) \ B5. Since T ′|D′ (a) = T |D(a) for all a ∈ A, the set A is a minimal
CO-retentive set in T ′. On the other hand, CO(D′ (b1i )) = {a2}, which means that B is
not CO-retentive in T ′. Furthermore, no minimal CO-retentive set X can contain b1i :
every such set would also have to contain CO(D′ (b1i )) = {a2}, and X′ = X∩A would
be a strictly smaller CO-retentive set. Thus b1i < C˚O(T
′).
7 Discussion
Starting with the trivial tournament solution, we have defined an infinite sequence of
efficiently computable tournament solutions that, under certain conditions, are strictly
contained in one another, strictly contain TEQ, and share most of its desirable prop-
erties. The implications of these findings are both of theoretical and practical nature.
From a practical point of view, we have outlined an anytime algorithm for com-
puting TEQ that returns smaller and smaller supersets of TEQ, which furthermore sat-
isfy standard properties suggested in the literature. Previous algorithms for TEQ (see,
e.g., Brandt et al., 2010) are incapable of providing any useful information in general
when stopped prematurely.
From a theoretical point of view, the new perspective on TEQ as the limit of
an infinite sequence of tournament solutions may prove useful to improve our un-
derstanding of Schwartz’s conjecture. In particular, it yields an infinite sequence of
increasingly difficult conjectures, each of them a weaker version of that of Schwartz.
We proved the second conjecture in this sequence. Now that Schwartz’s conjecture
itself has been shown to be false, a natural question is how many statements of this
sequence still hold. As exemplified in this article, both proving and disproving this
kind of conjectures turns out to be surprisingly difficult.
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Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 Let S be a tournament solution such that RS is pairwise intersecting,
and let P be any of the properties SSP,WSP, IUA,MON ∧ SSP, or γ̂ ∧ SSP. Then,
P is satisfied by S if and only if it is satisfied by S˚ .
Proof Assume that RS is pairwise intersecting. We need to show that each of the
properties SSP,WSP, IUA,MON∧SSP, and γ̂∧SSP is satisfied by S if and only if
it is satisfied by S˚ . The direction from right to left follows from Theorem 2. We now
show that the properties are inherited from S to S˚ .
Assume that S satisfies SSP. Let T = (A,) be a tournament, and consider an
alternative x ∈ A \ S˚ (T ). We need to show that S˚ (T ′) = S˚ (T ), where T ′ = (A \ {x},
). Since RS is assumed to be pairwise intersecting, it suffices to show that for all
a ∈ S˚ (T ), S (DA(a)) = S (DA\{x}(a)). To this end, consider an arbitrary a ∈ S˚ (T ).
If x < DA(a), then obviously DA(a) = DA\{x}(a) and thus S (DA(a)) = S (DA\{x}(a)).
Assume on the other hand that x ∈ DA(a). Since a ∈ S˚ (T ) and x < S˚ (T ), it follows
that x < S (DA(a)), as otherwise S˚ (T ) would not be S -retentive. Now, since S satisfies
SSP, we obtain S (DA(a)) = S (DA\{x}(a)) as desired.
Assume that S satisfies WSP. Let T = (A,) be a tournament, and consider an
alternative x ∈ A \ S˚ (T ). We need to show that S˚ (T ′) ⊆ S˚ (T ), where T ′ = (A \ {x},).
Since RS is assumed to be pairwise intersecting, it suffices to show that S˚ (T ) is also
S -retentive in T ′. To this end, consider an arbitrary a ∈ S˚ (T ). Since S satisfies WSP,
we have that S (DA\{x}(a)) ⊆ S (DA(a)). Furthermore, by S -retentiveness of S˚ (T ),
S (DA(a)) ⊆ S˚ (T ) and thus S (DA\{x}(a)) ⊆ S˚ (T ).
Assume that S satisfies IUA. Let T = (A,) and T ′ = (A,′) be tournaments
with x, y ∈ A \ S˚ (T ) and T |A\{x,y} = T ′|A\{x,y}. We need to show that S˚ (T ) = S˚ (T ′).
Since RS is assumed to be pairwise intersecting, it suffices to show that for all a ∈
S˚ (T ), S (D(a),) = S (D′ (a),′). To this end, consider an arbitrary a ∈ S˚ (T ).
By assumption, a , x and a , y. First consider the case when both x ∈ D(a) and
y ∈ D(a). Then, D(a) = D′ (a) and, by S -retentiveness of S˚ (T ), x, y < S (D(a),).
Since S satisfies IUA, S (D(a),) = S (D′ (a),′) as required. Now consider the
case when x < D(a) or y < D(a). Then, T |D(a) = T ′|D′ (a), and the claim follows
immediately.
Assume that S satisfies MON and SSP. We have already seen that SSP is in-
herited, so it remains to be shown that S˚ satisfies MON. The following argument is
adapted from the proof of Proposition 3.6 in Laffond et al. (1993a). Let T = (A,)
be a tournament, and consider two alternatives a, b ∈ A such that a ∈ S˚ (T ) and b  a.
Let T ′ = (A,′) be the tournament with T |A\{a} = T ′|A\{a} and D′ (a) = D(a) ∪ {b}.
We have to show that a ∈ S˚ (T ′). To this end, we claim that for all c ∈ A \ {a},
a < S (D′ (c),′) implies S (D(c),) = S (D′ (c),′). (1)
Consider the case when c , b and assume that a < S (D′ (c),′). It follows from
monotonicity of S that a < S (D(c),). To see this, observe that monotonicity of S
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implies that a ∈ S (D′ (c),′) whenever a ∈ S (D(c),). Now, since S satisfies SSP,
S (D′ (c),′) = S (D′ (c) \ {a},′) and
S (D(c),) = S (D(c) \ {a},).
It is easily verified that (D′ (c) \ {a},′) = (D(c) \ {a},), thus we have
S (D′ (c),′) = S (D(c),).
If c = b, then a < S (D′ (b),′) together with SSP of S implies S (D′ (b),′) =
S (D′ (b) \ {a},′). Furthermore, by definition of T and T ′, (D′ (b) \ {a},′) =
(D(b),) and thus S (D′ (b),′) = S (D(b),). This proves (1).
We proceed to show that a ∈ S˚ (T ′). Assume for contradiction that this is not the
case. We claim that this implies that
S˚ (T ′) is S -retentive in T. (2)
To see this, consider c ∈ S˚ (T ′). We have to show that S (D(c),) ⊆ S˚ (T ′). Since, by
assumption, a < S˚ (T ′), we have that a < S (D′ (c),′). We can thus apply (1) and get
S (D(c),) = S (D′ (c),′) for all c ∈ S˚ (T ′),
which, together with the S -retentiveness of S˚ (T ′) in T ′, implies (2).
Having assumed that RS is pairwise intersecting, it follows from (2) that S˚ (T ) ⊆
S˚ (T ′). Hence, a < S˚ (T ), a contradiction. This shows that S˚ satisfies MON.
Finally assume that S satisfies γ̂ and SSP. We already know from the above that
S˚ satisfies SSP, so it remains to be shown that S˚ satisfies γ̂. Let T = (A,) be a
tournament, and consider two subsets B1, B2 ⊆ A such that S˚ (B1) = S˚ (B2) = X. We
have to show that S˚ (B1 ∪ B2) = X. Since RS is assumed to be pairwise intersecting,
it suffices to show that for all x ∈ X, S (DB1∪B2 (x)) = S (DB1 (x)). To this end, consider
an arbitrary x ∈ X. As S˚ (B1) and S˚ (B2) are S -retentive in B1 and B2, respectively,
we have S (DBi (x)) ⊆ X ⊆ B1 ∩ B2 for i ∈ {1, 2}. The fact that S satisfies SSP
now implies S (DB1∩B2 (x)) = S (DB1 (x)) and S (DB1∩B2 (x)) = S (DB2 (x)), and thus
S (DB1 (x)) = S (DB2 (x)). Since S satisfies γ̂, we have S (DB1∪B2 (x)) = S (DB1 (x) ∪
DB2 (x)) = S (DB1 (x)), as desired. uunionsq
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